relative price of manufactures fell everywhere, especially in the periphery where they were imported. The world transport revolution made it possible for the distant periphery to supply this booming demand for primary products in the core. Both forces produced positive, powerful and sustained terms of trade shocks in the periphery, raising the relative price of primary products, and through an epoch which stretched over as much as seventy or eighty years. Factor supply responses in the periphery facilitated these external demand shocks, carried by migrations from labor abundant to labor scarce regions within the periphery and by financial capital flows from the core to those same regions.
Eventually these two forces abated. The rate of decline in real transport costs along sea lanes slowed down, approaching a late 20 th century steady state (Mohammed and Williamson 2004) . The rate of growth of manufacturing slowed down in the core as the transition to industrial maturity was completed. As these two forces abated, the resulting slow down in primary product demand growth was reinforced by resourcesaving innovations in the industrial core, induced, in large part, by those high and rising primary product prices during the 19 th century terms of trade upswing. Thus, the secular boom faded, eventually turning into a secular bust. Exactly when and where the boom turned to bust depended on export commodity specialization, but the periphery peak ranged between the 1870s and the 1890s.
This 130-year cycle in the periphery terms of trade is illustrated in Figure 1 by Latin American experience. The region's terms of trade 1 underwent a steady increase from the 1810s to the early 1890s, and the improvement was especially dramatic during the first four decades: the annual rate of increase was 1.3 percent per annum between the starting the half -decade 1815-19 and concluding the half-decade 1890-94, equivalent to almost a tripling over the 75 years; and the rate between 1815-19 and 1855-59 was even larger, 2.05 percent per annum. Furthermore, that increase is probably understated since it fails to take account of the likely increase in the quality of traded manufactures relative to primary products, estimated in Figure 1 by the dashed line. Based on the estimates underlying Figure 1 reported in Appendix 1, the quality-adjusted terms of trade may have grown at a little more than 2.2 percent per annum between 1815-19 and 1855-59, and at a little more than 1.4 percent per annum between 1815-19 and 1890-94.
Nor was Latin American experience with that secular upswing unusual. Figure 2 documents that the increase was even bigger in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) and Indonesia. 2 What went up then came down with a crash, as the periphery terms of trade fell from the 1870s or 1890s to World War II. As it turns out, the size of that crash has been overstated to the extent that manufactured commodities underwent much faster quality improvement than primary products. Once again, the dashed line in Figure 1 illustrates the point by use of Latin America: since relative quality gains are typically ignored in estimates of trade trends, and since they favor manufacturing, the qualityadjusted price of manufactures must have fallen by more than the unadjusted series documents (see Appendix 1), enough to have removed some of the terms of trade crash.
Exactly how much of the crash would be removed with better quality adjustments is unclear, but this new adjusted series still documents a secular cycle over the 130 years.
Whether during boom or bust, technological advance and human capital accumulation were so modest in the periphery that the living standard gap between it and 2 The boom was more modest in India (Clingingsmith and Williamson 2004) , but it was about the same in the Mideast after 1839, and even more dramatic in Japan after 1858 and the gunboat-forced opening up.
the core surged to levels that were vastly wider at the end of the cycle than when it started almost a century and a half before. Whether the modest rates of technological advance and human capital accumulation in the periphery were caused at least partly by globalization-induced de -industrialization forces has, of course, been a central issue in growth and development debate since it all started.
Between 1810 and 1940, the periphery obeyed laws of motion that economists delight in exploring. The long run secular boom and bust was generated in response to two of the most profound technological shocks the world had yet seen -in industry and transportation, shocks exogenous to the periphery if not the core. Elsewhere, I have assessed the implications of this secular cycle in terms of trade on income distribution (Williamson 2002 (Williamson , 2005a , and then asked how trade policy responded to it in periphery regions with and without autonomy (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004a, b; Williamson 2005a, b) . This Lecture documents these laws of motion in the periphery and assesses their growth consequences. 1992) . Others make the case for growth-suppressing rent-seeking (Krueger 1974; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Baland and Francois 2000) and to growth-distorting government policy (Tornell and Lane 1999) . Still others favor crowding-out and Dutch disease, a position this Lecture also favor s. Initiated first by Bob Gregory (1976) , Max Corden (1981 Corden ( , 1984 and Corden and Peter Neary (1982) , a huge literature has developed over the past twenty-five years which has examined how manufacturing in modern economies has been affected by the discovery of tradable natural resources or by an increase in their price. The name "Dutch disease" is taken from the impact of natural gas price increases on the Dutch economy in the 1970s. The most extensive applications, however, have been to Third World economies which specialize in primary products. The Prebisch-Singer primary-product-terms-of-trade-deterioration thesis has not survived the half century since they wrote: fifty years later, we now think that structural breaks, serially correlated residuals, and unit roots may explain the 20 th century (unadjusted) terms of trade patterns we see, or that proper quality-adjustment might further erase any deterioration . Thus, Enzo Grilli and Maw Cheng Yang (1988) analyzed 20 th century commodity price data and found evidence of periodic structural breaks, but no trend. Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) contested this finding, but were able to document only a modest downward trend. Furthermore, and to repeat, most of the periphery was little damaged by this modest secular deterioration since by the 1990s the majority had shifted out of primary-product exports and in to labor -intensive manufacture exports. Thus , from today's vantage point, the Prebisch-Singer secular deterioration hypothesis, and its implied negative impact, can be rejected. It is not clear, however, that it should be rejected from the vantage point of 1950 when Singer and
Prebisch were looking backward to the 1870s. Nor has the modern literature yet measured the impact that the terms of trade secular deterioration had on long run GDP per capita growth in the periphery. And if we had the answer, we could then use it to help assess data-scarce terms of trade boom period before the 1870s, when the great divergence between center and periphery development levels appeared.
The jury is still out. What we need is a larger sample of periphery countries, and we need it for the period that motivated the Prebisch-Singer debate in the first place. It has prove n difficult to construct the necessary data base for the pre-1870 epoch, but we 
Agenda: Assessing the Impact of Terms of Trade Volatility on the Pre -Modern Periphery
Until the last three decades or so, most countries in the periphery specialized in the export of just a handful of commodities (Table 1 , cols. 3 and 7). In the 1920s, for example, the top two exports were 82 percent of all exports from the average Third World country, while they were 12 percent in the industrial core even two decades earlier. Furthermore, some of these commodities had prices which were a lot more volatile than others, and those countries with the greater volatility grew more slowly relative to the industrial leaders and relative to other primary product exporters. Figure 5 charts income per head in 1939 against terms of trade volatility for 35 countries between 1870 and 1939. 5 Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of departures from a slow -moving trend. 6 The figure clearly depicts a negative correlation between terms of trade volatility and subsequent level of development, not just in the total sample but also within the subset of primary product-specialized countries in the periphery. argued that each country's exportable resources were determined in large part by geography (plus the previous century's experience with global market integration), and that differences in subsequent economic development were a consequence of the economic, political and institutional attributes of each commodity.
So far, this Lecture has focused on secular terms of trade movements and their implications for industrialization and de -industrialization, but could it be that exogenous price volatility of each primary product also mattered by generating internal instability, reduced investment, and diminished economic growth? Observers regularly point to terms of trade shocks as a key source of macroeconomic instability in commodityspecialized countries, but they pay far less attention to the long run growth implications of such instability. 7 Most theories stress the investment channel in looking for connections between terms of trade instability and growth. Indeed, the development literature offers an abundance of microeconomic evidence linking income volatility to lower investment in both physical and human capital. Households imperfectly protected from risk change their income-generating activities in the face of income volatility, diversifying towards low-risk alternatives with lower average returns (Dercon 2004; Fafchamps 2004) , as well as to lower levels of investment (Rosenweig and Wolpin 1993) . Furthermore , severe cuts in health and education follow negative shocks to household income in poor countries-cuts that disproportionately affect children and hence long term human capital accumulation (Jensen 2000; Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Frankenburg et al. 1999; Thomas et al. 2004 ).
Poor households find it difficult to smooth their expenditures in the face of shocks because they are rationed in credit and insurance markets, so they lower investment and take fewer risks with what remains. Poor firms find it difficult to smooth net returns on their assets, so they lower investment and take fewer risks with what remains. Perhaps most importantly, poor governments whose revenue sources are mainly volatile customs duties (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004b; Williamson 2005b ) and which also find it difficult to borrow at cheap rates locally and internationally, cannot without serious difficulty smooth public investment in and expenditure on long run infrastructure and education in the face of terms of trade shocks. 8 Lower public investment ensues, and growth rates fall. Garey and Valerie Ramey (1995) examined the macroec onomic volatility and growth correlation using data from 92 developing and developed economies between 1962 and 1985. They found government spending and macroeconomic volatility to be inversely related, and that countries with higher volatility had lower mean growth.
In short, theory informs us that higher volatility in the terms of trade should reduce investment and growth in the presence of risk aversion. In addition, the less-risky investment that does take place will also be low-return. Modern evidence seems to be consistent with the theory. What is true of the modern era was probably even more true of To see whether the terms of trade impact was contingent upon the level of export dependence, our previous collaborative work added a term interacting TOT Trend
Growth with export share of GDP. The motivation, of course was that more exportoriented countries seemed likely to respond more forcefully to external shocks. Export shares were taken from the first year of the decade to avoid problems of endogeneity. In any case, the key results were not greatly influence by this complication, so Table 2 ignores it in order to make things simple here. Finally, Table 2 also reports estimates with and without control varia bles representing other long run growth "fundamentals" like (log) initial GDP per capita, lagged population growth and the prevalence of schooling. I favor the results with the controls, so I will focus on cols. (2), (4), (6) and (8) in what follows.
The top half of Table 2 reports the regression estimates and hypothesis testing for the terms of trade effects. The bottom half reports the quantitative and economic importance of these terms of trade effects. Thus, the bottom half shows the sample means and standard deviations of the independent variables. The ir marginal impact is, of course, measured as the predicted change in output growth from a marginal increase in the independent variable. That is, for both terms of trade trend growth and volatility, the marginal impact is just the reported coefficient estimate. However, the last rows of Table   2 show the predicted change in output from a one -standard-deviation increase in either the growth or volatility of the terms of trade, thus showing how a plausible change in either independent variable would have influenced output. The word "plausible" applies to the years covered by the sample, namely 1870-1939. The change may not be quite so plausible when applied outside the sample, namely 1810-1870, when the terms of trade for primary products soared. We will return to this issue below.
Columns (2) and (4) strongly support the asymmetry hypothesis. Greater secular improvements in the terms of trade were significantly and positively associated with long run output growth in the core, but not in the periphery. While the core benefited greatly from a small but positive secular improvement in its terms of trade, positive improvement in the periphery-when it made a rare appearance-did not translate in to more growth, but less. Greater volatility had a significant negative influence on income growth in the periphery, but not in the core.
Although not reported here, the main findings continue to receive strong support for the pre-World War I years. Secular improvements in the terms of trade raised long run output growth in the core, but not in the periphery, while greater volatility diminished growth in the periphery, but not in the core. The interwar years involve a much smaller sample and, as a result, the standard error s are large and the statistical significance is low, but the point estimates are generally consistent with those found for the pre-war era. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the same forces were at work both before and after the war. Still, strong support for the asymmetry hypothesis is especially welcome for the 1870-1910 years, since that result will reinforce the plausibility of exploring its implications for the immediately preceding 1810-1870 period.
The economic effects were very big. A one -standard-deviation increase in TOT Trend Growth was associated with a 0.64 percentage point increase in the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in the core --a big number given that the average annual per capita growth rate in the core was just 1. 59 percent. The economic effect of TOT Volatility in the periphery was even bigger: a one -standard-deviation increase lowered output growth by nearly 0. 39 percentage points, a big number given that the average per capita growth rate in the periphery was just 1.05 percent per annum. To repeat, these magnitudes are very similar with and without the export share interaction term.
More generally, these magnitudes suggest that terms of trade shocks were an important force behind the big divergence in income levels between core and periphery, a core-periphery gap that started to open up so dramatically in the early 19 th century (Pritchett 1997 (1964: 19) concluded that quality improvements in traded manufactured goods was too slow to influence short run terms of trade instability, so any estimated quality adjustment should not influence our volatility inferences. It did, however, influence secular change in the terms of trade, as we see in Figure Table 2 imply that if, through better luck in the commodity lottery, Indonesia had experienced Canada's smaller terms of trade volatility, it would have grown faster by about 0.3 percentage points, reducing the growth rate gap between them by a third. So, exactly what kind of insurance did the industrial core take out that allowed it to escape the damaging cons equences of terms of trade instability, insurance that was not, apparently, available to primary product exporters in the periphery? Did the industrial core simply have better-developed institutions, policies and tax mechanisms by which to insure against adverse shocks? I do not offer any answers here in this Lecture, but the questions certainly suggest an exciting agenda for the future.
Volatility, Accumulation Inferences and Backward Projections to 1815
Although the secular rise in the periphery's terms of trade up to the 1870s or 1890s was certainly spectacular, the empirical results for 1870-1939 suggest that they probably made no positive contribution to economic growth there. While much more needs to be done to identify the channels of this impact, the most promising hypothesis is that de-industrialization was the long run offset to short run income or medium term specialization gains. Furthermore, to the extent that industrialization had a positive impact on human and physical capital accumulation, this is one plausible channel through which de -industrialization contributed to diminished growth. We will pursue the connection below.
But assuming for the moment that the secular boom in the terms of trade had no net long term positive impact in the poor periphery, what about the negative impact of export price and terms of trade volatility? Once again, while the data are not adequate to estimate the impact of pre-1870 volatility, we can use the 1870-1939 parameter estimates to project that impact backwards given the pre-1870 terms of trade experience. One only has to assume that the pre-1870 forces at work were equal to or greater than those estimated for post-1870, an assumption which seems plausible to me. Thus, I use the same Hodrick-Prescott filter to remove the trend from the pre-1870 terms of trade reported for various periphery regions, leaving the volatility portion for analysis.
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I ha ve collected pre-1870 terms of trade time series for the following seven regions in the poor periphery: Egypt, India, Indonesia, Latin America, the Mideast, Spain and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey The terms of trade volatility in the poor periphery was much greater before 1870 than after -more than half again as large --implying that it played an even bigger role in contributing to the core-periphery growth rate gap before 1870. If the GDP per capita growth gap between core and periphery 1815-1870 was anything like it was 1870-1939, terms of trade volatility must have explained two thirds of the gap. To be more confident about this inference, we need to compare periphery with core. Recall from While the volatility differences before and after 1870 are large, the differences between the periphery regions are even larger. Indonesia and Latin America had Terms of trade volatility in the periphery suppressed long run growth considerably there, helping contribute to the rising GDP per capita gap between it and the core. As we suggested above, it seems likely that the key channel of impact was through suppressed accumulation rates. Indeed, when one channel of terms of trade impact is investigated-the flow of investment funds from Britain-it appears that capital inflows 1870-1939 were negatively influenced by terms of trade volatility in the periphery, but not in the core (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson 2004) .
Are the magnitudes driving the econometric result in Table 2 plausible? That is, how much would accumulation rates and investment rates ha ve to have fallen in the poor periphery to account for the estimated impact of terms of trade volatility on growth? The econometric estimates in Table 2 
Appendix 1 Adjusting Terms of Trade Trends for Quality Change in Manufactures
John Spraos (1980) calculated that the price of primary products relative to manufactures fell at about 0.5 percent per annum between the 1870s and just before World War II. Enzo Grilli and Maw Cheng Yang (1988) There have been very few attempts to gauge how product quality changes influence export and import prices, and thus the terms of trade, although the re have been quite a few attempts to correct domestic prices for quality change. Most of the latter have been for post-war United States (Gordon 1990; Boskin et al. 1998) , and hedonic techniques have been preferred by most investigators. Robert Lipsey and his collaborators have used the estimated impact of US product quality change on traded goods prices Lipsey 1971, 1992; Lipsey, Molinari, and Kravis 1991; . For the period 1953 to 1991, they report two findings that are especially relevant to any assessment of terms of trade's long run impact on core relative to periphery.
First, "these quality adjustments are much too gradual to offset the large shortterm or medium-term cycles in terms of trade" (Lipsey 1994: 19) . This is an important finding since it implies that volatility measures of the terms of trade 1870-1940 will not be affected by the omission of quality adjustments.
Second, however, secular movements in the pre-1940 terms of trade are likely to be profoundly affected since the "average declines in the [quality] adjusted indexes relative to the unadjusted ones for [US] exports to the world ... are ... more than a half percent per year for all manufacturers …" (Lipsey 1994: 18) . Thus, the fall in the terms of trade facing primary product exporters 1900-1986 estimated at 0.5 percent per annum would have been completely offset if the 0.5 percent per annum quality change for manufacturers during the second half of the 20 th century also applied to the first half.
What appeared to Prebisch and Singer to be a spectacular fall in the relative price of primary products up to 1940 may have been an illusion created by mis-measurement.
Furthermore, the rise in the terms of trade facing primary product exporters 1810-1870 must be understated to the extent that this post-World War II experience also applied to the pre-1870 period, although perhaps not with as much drama.
Since the rate of productivity advance was faster in the 20 th century than it was in the 19 th century, there is little reason to believe that the same 0.5 percent per annum adjustment would apply to the 1810-1870 terms of trade boom facing the periphery. But suppose that the rate of quality improvement in traded manufactures was highly correlated with the rate of productivity growth in manufacturing? If so, a quality adjustment would still be necessary for 1810-1870, but it would be a much smaller adjustment than for 1953-1991. We have a fair idea of how much smaller.
The best long run estimates of total factor productivity growth (TFPG) or multifactor productivity growth (MFPG) are for the United States and they also have the advantage of being estimated separately for manufacturing. These figures and their implications for guesses about the rate of quality change on traded manufactures are reported in Table A1 -1: Gordon (1993 ,  Table H ). Numbers in parentheses interpolated from first column. The estimated quality change for 1964-1990 uses Lipsey's 0.50 estimate for 1953-1991; the other entries are assumed to follow the same trend as the MFPG for manufacturing.
To account for these estimated quality improvements in imported manufactured goods, Table A1 -1 implies that the per annum rate of change in the terms of trade facing poor primary product exporters should be raised by: 1810-1870 0.09; 1870-1913 0.15; 1913-1939 0.63; and 1870-1939 16 To summarize the discussion above, volatility is measured here as the standard deviation of departures from a trend calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The pre-1870 terms of trade volatility in the poor periphery was much greater than it was afterwards. What is more stunning, however, are the differences between these regions, all of which was dictated by natural endowment and commodity specialization. Indonesia and Latin America had very stable terms of trade . Egypt, India, and the Mideast, on the other hand, had immense volatility. Spain and Turkey lay somewhere in between with volatility figures closer to the 1870-1939 average. 15 The smoothing parameter in the HP filter is set at 300, which implies a relatively slow-changing trend. A more quickly changing trend (such as that achieved with a smoothing parameter of 100 or lower) does not materially affect the results. 16 The sources of the pre-1870 price data for exports (Px), imports (Pm) and thus for the net barter terms of trade (Px/Pm) for Indonesia, India, Latin America, Turkey and Egypt can be found in Clingingsmith and Williamson (2004) . The Px/Pm data for the United Kingdom are from Brian Mitchell and Phyllis Deane (1962: 331) . The Mideast Px/Pm data are composed of an unweighted average of Aleppo, Beirut and Iraq (Issawi 1988: 148-50) . The Px/Pm data for Spain are from ongoing research by Leandro Prados.
